Thursday, August 19, 2010

Article I, Section 8, Clauses 1 through 10

The Constitution is the Solution
Temecula Constitution Study with Douglas V. Gibbs
August 19, 2010

Article I, Section 8, Clauses 1 through 10 (Next Week’s Handout Will Address the Remaining Clauses. . .

The Authorities of the United States Federal Government

Article I, Section 8, Clause 1:

The Congress shall have power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

Duties, Imposts and Excises are taxes.

Duties: A tax levied by a government on the import or export of goods.

Imposts: A tax, especially an import duty; Import Duty is a tariff paid at a border or port of entry to the relevant government to allow a good to pass into that government's territory.

Excise: Tax on the manufacture, sale, or consumption of goods, or upon licenses to pursue certain occupations, or upon corporate privileges.

In other words, the federal government could tax the States on just about everything. But, the federal government could not tax unless it was uniform, nor could it tax directly the individual citizens.

Why was the federal government given the power of taxation? The reasons are listed in this clause: to “to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.” In fact, this clause is a part of the primary reason for the Constitutional Convention in the first place.

Some of the members of the political system of the new nation had been complaining that the Articles of Confederation did not provide the United States with the ability, as a united nation, to defend itself. It was argued that the independent militias needed to be joined under a single federal army, and there also needed to be a single federal navy. In order to have a military, however, the federal government would also need the power to tax in order to pay for the military it would be afforded. If the federal government was able to wage war, to help pay for the expensive endeavor of war, the federal government would need to be able to borrow money for the war effort, as well. Therefore, a new Constitution was needed to give the federal government more power for these reasons. Since these were the primary, and most important, powers granted, they were listed first under Article I, Section 8.

The ability to tax, however, was something the Founding Fathers wished to step lightly regarding. The Intolerable Acts, a series of actions by the British Empire against the colonies before the Revolutionary War, were nearly all taxes (save for the quartering of British troops), and were among the reasons for the launch of the Revolution. The power to tax by a government can easily be abused, so the Founding Fathers wished to be careful on how that power was given. Therefore, originally, the federal government taxed the States. Any direct taxation of the people was performed by State governments, not by the federal government.



Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3 lays down how the States would be taxed, reading: "Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included in this union, according to their respective numbers..."

The reference to direct taxes in that clause is a reference to a direct taxation on the States, not individuals. In order to clarify that such taxation must also be proportioned based on a State’s population, Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 reads:

"No capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken."

The Founding Fathers understood that a massive central government would require a healthy diet of revenue, so they limited taxation to be from the States, and from foreign governments. The Founders were careful not to give the federal government expansive powers to tax the people. In fact, under the Articles of Confederation, the central government had no taxing powers at all. Revenues were raised by the sovereign States, and then provided as the States felt was necessary.

The Founding Fathers did not adopt an income tax. In fact, Thomas Jefferson made it a point to denounce the notion of income taxation in his first inaugural address, saying “a wise and frugal government. . . Shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned.” The purpose of government was to protect the God-given rights of life, liberty and property, not to take them away.

The first federal income tax was introduced in 1862, but was abolished in 1872. A flat-rate income tax was adopted in 1894, but was ruled unconstitutional because it was not levied in proportion to state population. Finally, by 1913, the progressives got their income tax. To garner support, they reduced tariff rates, and then proclaimed they were having a revenue problem, and direct taxation via an income tax was necessary. President Woodrow Wilson convened an emergency session of Congress, and the income tax was pushed through with a constitutional amendment to allow it, eventually becoming law on October 3, 1916.

The income tax ended the ability of the citizens to influence the federal government, giving the federal government a seemingly unlimited access to funds, and allowing it to pry into every business transaction and the records of every working person in America. In the process, the federal government began to fund programs, diminishing the ability of the state and local governments to finance their activities, and rendering the States to becoming beggers for federal funding, and giving the federal government the ability to extort the States whenever they desired a particular behavior by the States - extorting the States by simply threatening to withhold federal funding.

The income tax also repudiated Jefferson’s natural rights doctrine. Private property became accessible by the government. The amount of income the individual citizen got to keep became determined by the needs of the government. And if the taxpayer refused to pay up? The government was given the authority to imprison the citizen, and confiscate his wealth, until the payment of taxes due was made.

Taxation was established by the Founding Fathers to “pay all Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.

Notice that there is no mention of any of the federal programs we see in force today. The common Defence meant national security, and the general Welfare was of the Republic, not individuals, as some politicians would argue today. If the general Welfare clause meant what the progressives indicate, including entitlement programs, then rather than general Welfare, the term would be “individual Welfare.” Still, the income tax is Constitutional, because a Constitutional amendment, the 16th Amendment, was passed.

Article I, Section 8, Clause 2

To borrow money on the credit of the United States;

The federal government was given the power to borrow money, primarily for military reasons. The intent was not for the nation to enter into a constant chain of deficit spending. Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury, however, championed an economic model similar to what would later become the Keynesian economic model. As a result, Hamilton increased our national debt, as did his successors. It wasn’t until 1836, during Andrew Jackson’s presidency, that the deficit was completely paid off. We remained in the black for two years, before a growing government again went into debt.

Article I, Section 8, Clause 3:

To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes;

Remember, the States did not get along. They argued over the borders between the states, and trade among themselves. As sovereign entities, the States continually tried to gain the upper hand on the other States in regard to commerce across State lines. Recognizing that the squabbles between the States was actually hindering commerce across State lines, the federal government in this clause was given the authority to do what it took to make the flow of commerce more regular. However, this clause has been interpreted to mean the opposite by the federal government of today. Now, the Commerce Clause is used as a means to restrict and heavily control commerce between the States. If one was to adopt the progressive definition of the Commerce Clause, one could then surmise that the Founders wrote this clause because commerce was flowing too easily, and needed to be controlled by the federal government. Such a notion is not only untrue, but outside the normal tendencies of the Founding Fathers. The Founders believed in limiting the powers of the Federal Government, so why would they allow the Federal Government the kind of unlimited powers over interstate commerce as suggested by today’s progressive?

Article I, Section 8, Clause 4:

To establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States;

This clause established naturalization rules regarding immigrants that wished to become new citizens of this nation. Note that it does not give the federal government any authority over the actual immigration of these persons, nor the enforcement authority to enforce immigration.

The part of the clause calling for uniform laws on bankruptcy was to ensure each state followed the same rules and laws regarding bankruptcy. Before the Constitution was ratified, each State had its own rules on bankruptcy, and also citizens would simply cross state lines to start over financially, leaving no uniform laws to govern bankruptcies.

Article I, Section 8, Clause 5:

To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures;

Notice that Congress is not given the authority to issue federal reserve notes, or any other kind of paper money. The coins were expected to made of metals that reflected the worth of the coins. In other words, the gold in a coin, if taken to a goldsmith, would be worth the same as the value of the coin. Later, with paper money, the banks realized they could loan on the gold in their vaults backing the currency, leaving less gold as a reserve. When this happened, if there was a bank run, where everyone brought their money in to cash it in for gold at once, the bank would be left in a situation where they did not have enough gold to cover all of the notes.

Also, if one goes back to the Articles of Confederation, it is important to note that under the confederation, there had been no power given to the central government to regulate the value of foreign coin, an omission, which in a great measure would destroy any uniformity in the value of the current coin, since the respective states might, by different
regulations, create a different value in each. As a result, the States were prohibited from coining their own money, thus taking away their ability to manipulate the value of currency as a means of effecting the economies of the other states.

Fixing a standard of weights and measures was important for the reason of uniformity, and the ease of commerce. This clause suggests that before the Constitutional Convention the States were able to independently fix their own weights and measures, which not only added confusion to commerce, but enabled the States of use unsavory trading tactics against each other.

Article I, Section 8, Clause 6:

To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States;

This power would naturally flow, as an incident, from the antecedent powers to borrow money, and regulate the coinage; and, indeed, without it those powers would be without any adequate sanction. The word “securities,” in this clause, means: a contract that can be assigned a value so that it may be traded, like a “bond.”

Article I, Section 8, Clause 7:

To establish post offices and post roads;

As with the other clauses in Article I, Section 8, this clause is designed to promote the Union. In this case, it ensures that communication remains intact. Note, also, that the clause gives the federal government the authority to establish post roads, but not create or maintain them. The Constitution does not give the federal government any other authority over roadways. In fact, this is the only reference to roadways to the federal government in the entire Constitution. This would make the Interstate highway system, and the other workings of the federal transportation department, unconstitutional. It was up to the States to create and maintain their roadways. If the States desired to remained connected, and receive their mail, they would keep up their roads.

In 1817, Congress proposed federal funding for boatways and roadways, claiming it was for the “general welfare” of the nation. President James Madison vetoed the bill, claiming it to be unconstitutional, because the federal government was not given the authority to fund transportation routes.

The text of his statement regarding his veto is as follows:


March 3, 1817

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

Having considered the bill this day presented to me entitled "An act to set apart and pledge certain funds for internal improvements," and which sets apart and pledges funds "for constructing roads and canals, and improving the navigation of water courses, in order to facilitate, promote, and give security to internal commerce among the several States, and to render more easy and less expensive the means and provisions for the common defense," I am constrained by the insuperable difficulty I feel in reconciling the bill with the Constitution of the United States to return it with that objection to the House of Representatives, in which it originated.

The legislative powers vested in Congress are specified and enumerated in the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution, and it does not appear that the power proposed to be exercised by the bill is among the enumerated powers, or that it falls by any just interpretation with the power to make laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution those or other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States.

"The power to regulate commerce among the several States" can not include a power to construct roads and canals, and to improve the navigation of water courses in order to facilitate, promote, and secure such commerce without a latitude of construction departing from the ordinary import of the terms strengthened by the known inconveniences which doubtless led to the grant of this remedial power to Congress.

To refer the power in question to the clause "to provide for common defense and general welfare" would be contrary to the established and consistent rules of interpretation, as rendering the special and careful enumeration of powers which follow the clause nugatory and improper. Such a view of the Constitution would have the effect of giving to Congress a general power of legislation instead of the defined and limited one hitherto understood to belong to them, the terms "common defense and general welfare" embracing every object and act within the purview of a legislative trust. It would have the effect of subjecting both the Constitution and laws of the several States in all cases not specifically exempted to be superseded by laws of Congress, it being expressly declared "that the Constitution of the United States and laws made in pursuance thereof shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges of every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." Such a view of the Constitution, finally, would have the effect of excluding the judicial authority of the United States from its participation in guarding the boundary between the legislative powers of the General and the State Governments, inasmuch as questions relating to the general welfare, being questions of policy and expediency, are unsusceptible of judicial cognizance and decision.

A restriction of the power "to provide for the common defense and general welfare" to cases which are to be provided for by the expenditure of money would still leave within the legislative power of Congress all the great and most important measures of Government, money being the ordinary and necessary means of carrying them into execution.

If a general power to construct roads and canals, and to improve the navigation of water courses, with the train of powers incident thereto, be not possessed by Congress, the assent of the States in the mode provided in the bill can not confer the power. The only cases in which the consent and cession of particular States can extend the power of Congress are those specified and provided for in the Constitution.

I am not unaware of the great importance of roads and canals and the improved navigation of water courses, and that a power in the National Legislature to provide for them might be exercised with signal advantage to the general prosperity. But seeing that such a power is not expressly given by the Constitution, and believing that it can not be deduced from any part of it without an inadmissible latitude of construction and reliance on insufficient precedents; believing also that the permanent success of the Constitution depends on a definite partition of powers between the General and the State Governments, and that no adequate landmarks would be left by the constructive extension of the powers of Congress as proposed in the bill, I have no option but to withhold my signature from it, and to cherishing the hope that its beneficial objects may be attained by a resort for the necessary powers to the same wisdom and virtue in the nation which established the Constitution in its actual form and providently marked out in the instrument itself a safe and practicable mode of improving it as experience might suggest.

James Madison,
President of the United States



Article I, Section 8, Clause 8:

To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries;

This clause is the basis for the creation of the U.S. Patent Office, and Copyright Office. Patent and copyright protections already existed in the British Empire, and for the protection of American inventions and writings, the Founding Fathers saw the need to establish such a power under the federal government as well, hoping that by being under federal authority, the rules would be uniform.

Article I, Section 8, Clause 9:

To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court;

Establishes the lower federal courts, enabling Congress to establish new courts whenever necessary - a power often abused when parties sought to stack the courts.

Article I Section 8, Clause 10:

To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations;

One of the factors in having this included was the problem with piracy in the Caribbean, as well as difficulties the new nation was having with the Barbary Pirates (Muslims). Though the United States was careful to create a system of justice that included due process for the citizens of the nation, the Constitution gave the federal government the power to punish offenses by foreign forces on the high seas without having to worry about habeas corpus, while still providing a courtroom setting for the offenders. In Federalist 42, Madison carefully explains that this provision “extends no further than to the establishment of courts for the trial of these offenses,” such as military courts, or international courts for international war crimes.

The remaining clauses, which will be explained in next week’s handout, are:

- To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water;

- To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years;

- To provide and maintain a navy;

- To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces;

- To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions;

- To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;
To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings;—And
To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.
Added Note:

Remember when I told you that one of the reasons that the Founding Fathers divided the voting powers, and giving only the House of Representatives to the people, was because they feared the people being fooled by a tyranny, should the people have the vote of the President, Senate, and House completely? The following is from Madison’s Notes on the Constitutional Convention, where they discuss exactly that:

Madison Debates
May 31
Madison Debates Contents
Monday May 31 [FN1], 1787

William Pierce from Georgia took his seat.

In Committee of the whole on Mr. Randolph's propositions.

The 3d. Resolution "that the national Legislature ought to consist of two branches" was agreed to without debate or dissent, except that of Pennsylvania, given probably from complaisance to Docr. Franklin who was understood to be partial to a single House of Legislation.

Resol: 4. [FN2] first clause "that the members of the first branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States" being taken up,

Mr. SHERMAN opposed the election by the people, insisting that it ought to be by the State Legislatures. The people he said, immediately should have as little to do as may be about the Government. They want information and are constantly liable to be misled.

Mr. GERRY. The evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy. The people do not want virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots. In Massts. it had been fully confirmed by experience that they are daily misled into the most baneful measures and opinions by the false reports circulated by designing men, and which no one on the spot can refute. One principal evil arises from the want of due provision for those employed in the administration of Governmt. It would seem to be a maxim of democracy to starve the public servants. He mentioned the popular clamour in Massts. for the reduction of salaries and the attack made on that of the Govr. though secured by the spirit of the Constitution itself. He had he said been too republican heretofore: he was still however republican, but had been taught by experience the danger of the levilling spirit.

Mr. MASON, argued strongly for an election of the larger branch by the people. It was to be the grand depository of the democratic principle of the Govtt. It was, so to speak, to be our House of Commons-It ought to know & sympathise with every part of the community; and ought therefore to be taken not only from different parts of the whole republic, but also from different districts of the larger members of it, which had in several instances particularly in Virga., different interests and views arising from difference of produce, of habits &c &c. He admitted that we had been too democratic but was afraid we sd. incautiously run into the opposite extreme. We ought to attend to the rights of every class of the people. He had often wondered at the indifference of the superior classes of society to this dictate of humanity & policy; considering that however affluent their circumstances, or elevated their situations, might be, the course of a few years, not only might but certainly would, distribute their posterity throughout the lowest classes of Society. Every selfish motive therefore, every family attachment, ought to recommend such a system of policy as would provide no less carefully for the rights and happiness of the lowest than of the highest orders of Citizens.

Mr. WILSON contended strenuously for drawing the most numerous branch of the Legislature immediately from the people. He was for raising the federal pyramid to a considerable altitude, and for that reason wished to give it as broad a basis as possible. No government could long subsist without the confidence of the people. In a republican Government this confidence was peculiarly essential. He also thought it wrong to increase the weight of the State Legislatures by making them the electors of the national Legislature. All interference between the general and local Governmts. should be obviated as much as possible. On examination it would be found that the opposition of States to federal measures had proceded much more from the officers of the States, than from the people at large.

Mr. MADISON considered the popular election of one branch of the National Legislature as essential to every plan of free Government. He observed that in some of the States one branch of the Legislature was composed of men already removed from the people by an intervening body of electors. That if the first branch of the general legislature should be elected by the State Legislatures, the second branch elected by the first-the Executive by the second together with the first; and other appointments again made for subordinate purposes by the Executive, the people would be lost sight of altogether; and the necessary sympathy between them and their rulers and officers, too little felt. He was an advocate for the policy of refining the popular appointments by successive filtrations, but though it might be pushed too far. He wished the expedient to be resorted to only in the appointment of the second branch of the Legislature, and in the Executive & judiciary branches of the Government. He thought too that the great fabric to be raised would be more stable and durable, if it should rest on the solid foundation of the people themselves, than if it should stand merely on the pillars of the Legislatures.

Mr. GERRY did not like the election by the people. The maxims taken from the British constitution were often fallacious when applied to our situation which was extremely different. Experience he said had shewn that the State legislatures drawn immediately from the people did not always possess their confidence. He had no objection however to an election by the people if it were so qualified that men of honor & character might not be unwilling to be joined in the appointments. He seemed to think the people might nominate a certain number out of which the State legislatures should be bound to choose.

Mr. BUTLER thought an election by the people an impracticable mode.

On the question for an election of the first branch of the national Legislature by the people.

Massts. ay. Connect. divd. N. York ay. N. Jersey no. Pena. ay. Delawe. divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Georga. ay.

The remaining Clauses of Resolution 4th. [FN3] relating to the qualifications of members of the National Legislature, [FN3] being pospd. nem. con., as entering too much into detail for general propositions:

The Committee proceeded to Resolution 5. [FN4] "that the second, [or senatorial] branch of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the first branch out of persons nominated by the State Legislatures."

Mr. SPAIGHT contended that the 2d. branch ought to be chosen by the State Legislatures and moved an amendment to that effect. Mr. BUTLER apprehended that the taking so many powers out of the hands of the States as was proposed, tended to destroy all that balance and security of interests among the States which it was necessary to preserve; and called on Mr. Randolph the mover of the propositions, to explain the extent of his ideas, and particularly the number of members he meant to assign to this second branch.

Mr. RAND observed that he had at the time of offering his propositions stated his ideas as far as the nature of general propositions required; that details made no part of the plan, and could not perhaps with propriety have been introduced. If he was to give an opinion as to the number of the second branch, he should say that it ought to be much smaller than that of the first; so small as to be exempt from the passionate proceedings to which numberous assemblies are liable. He observed that the general object was to provide a cure for the evils under which the U. S. laboured; that in tracing these evils to their origin every man had found it in the turbulence and follies of democracy: that some check therefore was to be sought for agst. this tendency of our Governments: and that a good Senate seemed most likely to answer the purpose.

Mr. KING reminded the Committee that the choice of the second branch as proposed (by Mr. Spaight) viz. by the State Legislatures would be impracticable, unless it was to be very numerous, or the idea of proportion among the States was to be disregarded. According to this idea, there must be 80 or 100 members to entitle Delaware to the choice of one of them. -Mr. SPAIGHT withdrew his motion.

Mr. WILSON opposed both a nomination by the State Legislatures, and an election by the first branch of the national Legislature, because the second branch of the latter, ought to be independent of both. He thought both branches of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the people, but was not prepared with a specific proposition. He suggested the mode of chusing the Senate of N. York to wit of uniting several election districts, for one branch, in chusing members for the other branch, as a good model.

Mr. MADISON observed that such a mode would destroy the influence of the smaller States associated with larger ones in the same district; as the latter would chuse from within themselves, altho' better men might be found in the former. The election of Senators in Virga. where large & small counties were often formed into one district for the purpose, had illustrated this consequence Local partiality, would often prefer a resident within the County or State, to a candidate of superior merit residing out of it. Less merit also in a resident would be more known throughout his own State.

Mr. SHERMAN favored an election of one member by each of the State Legislatures.

Mr. PINKNEY moved to strike out the "nomination by the State Legislatures." On this question.

[FN5]Massts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pena. no. Del divd. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Georg no. [FN6]

On the whole question for electing by the first branch out of nominations by the State Legislatures, Mass. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. Jersey. no. Pena. no. Del. no. Virga. ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Ga. no. [FN7]

So the clause was disagreed to & a chasm left in this part of the plan.

[FN8] The sixth Resolution stating the cases in which the national Legislature ought to legislate was next taken into discussion: On the question whether each branch shd. originate laws, there was an unanimous affirmative without debate. On the question for transferring all the Legislative powers of the existing Congs. to this Assembly, there was also a silent affirmative nem. con.

On the proposition for giving "Legislative power in all cases to which the State Legislatures were individually incompetent."

Mr. PINKNEY & Mr. RUTLEDGE objected to the vagueness of the term incompetent, and said they could not well decide how to vote until they should see an exact enumeration of the powers comprehended by this definition.

Mr. BUTLER repeated his fears that we were running into an extreme in taking away the powers of the States, and called on Mr. Randolp for the extent of his meaning.

Mr. RANDOLPH disclaimed any intention to give indefinite powers to the national Legislature, declaring that he was entirely opposed to such an inroad on the State jurisdictions, and that he did not think any considerations whatever could ever change his determination. His opinion was fixed on this point.

Mr. MADISON said that he had brought with him into the Convention a strong bias in favor of an enumeration and definition of the powers necessary to be exercised by the national Legislature; but had also brought doubts concerning its practicability. His wishes remained un ltered; but his doubts had become stronger. What his opinion might ultimately be he could not yet tell. But he should shrink from nothing which should be found essential to such a form of Govt. as would provide for the safety, liberty and happiness of the community. This being the end of all our deliberations, all the necessary means for attaining it must, however reluctantly, be submitted to.

On the question for giving powers, in cases to which the States are not competent, Massts. ay. Cont. divd. [Sharman no Elseworth ay] N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. Carolina ay. Georga. ay. [FN9]

The other clauses [FN10] giving powers necessary to preserve harmony among the States to negative all State laws contravening in the opinion of the Nat. Leg. the articles of union, down to the last clause, (the words "or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union," being added after the words "contravening &c. the articles of the Union," on motion of Dr. FRANKLIN) were agreed to witht. debate or dissent. The last clause of Resolution 6. [FN11] authorizing an exertion of the force of the whole agst. a delinquent State came next into consideration.

Mr. MADISON, observed that the more he reflected on the use of force, the more he doubted the practicability, the justice and the efficacy of it when applied to people collectively and not individually. -A union of the States containing such an ingredient seemed to provide for its own destruction. The use of force agst. a State, would look more like a declaration of war, than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might be bound. He hoped that such a system would be framed as might render this recourse [FN12] unnecessary, and moved that the clause be postponed. This motion was agreed to nem. con.

The Committee then rose & the House

Adjourned

FN1 The year "1787" is here inserted in the transcript.

FN2 The transcript changes "Resol: 4." to "The fourth Resolution."

FN3 In the transcript the words "Resolution 4th" are changed to "the fourth Resolution" and the phrase "the qualifications of members of the National Legislature" is italicized."

FN4 In the transcript the words "Resolution 5," are changed to "the fifth Resolution" and the words of the resolution are italicized.

FN5 This question [FN6] omitted in the printed Journal, & the votes applied to the succeeding one, instead of the votes as here stated [this note to be in the bottom margin]. [FN6]

FN6 In the transcript the vote reads: "*Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no-9; Delaware divided"; and Madison's direction concerning the footnote is omitted. The word "is" is inserted after the word "question."

FN7 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Virginia, South Carolina, aye-3; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, Georgia, no-7."

FN8 In this paragraph the transcript italicizes the following phrases: "the cases in which the national Legislature ought to legislate," "whether each branch shd. originate laws," "for transferring all the Legislative powers of the existing Cong. to this Assembly"; and the phrase "a silent affirmative nem. con." is changed to "an unanimous affirmative, without debate."

FN9 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye- 9; Connecticut divided (Sherman, no. Ellsworth, aye)."

FN10 The phrase, "giving powers necessary to preserve harmony among the States to negative all State laws contravening in the opinion of the Nat. Leg. the articles of union" is italicized in the transcript.

FN11 The words "the sixth Resolution" are substituted in the transcript for "resolution 6" and the phrase "authorizing and exertion of the force of the whole ags.t a delinquent State" is italicized.

FN12 The word "resource" is substituted in the transcript for "recourse."


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Thursday, August 12, 2010

Article I, Section 7: How a Bill Becomes A Law; Article I, Section 8: The Powers Granted To The Federal Government

Temecula Constitution Study - The Powers Given To The Federal Government are Limited, and Few

"I consider the foundation of the Constitution as laid on this ground that 'all powers not delegated to the United States, by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states or to the people.' To take a single step beyond the boundaries thus specially drawn around the powers of Congress, is to take possession of a boundless field of power, not longer susceptible of any definition." --Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank, 1791

"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite." --James Madison, Federalist No. 45

“Government's view of the economy could be summed up in a few short phrases: If it moves, tax it. If it keeps moving, regulate it. And if it stops moving, subsidise it” - - Ronald Reagan

The Constitution is the Solution
Constitution Study - August 12, 2010

Study Group Leader: Douglas V. Gibbs
@ Faith Armory, 27498 Enterprise Cir. W. #2, Temecula, CA

Article I, Section 7: How A Bill Becomes A Law, Article I, Section 8: The Powers Granted To The Federal Government

Article I, Section 7 explains how a bill becomes a law. Originally, before the 17th Amendment, when the State Legislatures appointed the U.S. Senators, the process was simple: The bill would be approved by the people (House of Representatives), The States (Senate), and the Federal Government (President). If either the people or the States did not like the bill, its journey to become a law stopped. If the federal government, via the President, did not like the bill, he could veto the bill, but it would not stop the bill from becoming law if the people (House) and States (Senate) were able to overturn the veto with a two thirds vote from each house of Congress. Be it by overriding a veto, or by the president signing the bill into law, that is the process on how a bill becomes a law according to the U.S. Constitution. . . For some reason an image of a little bill sitting on the steps of Capitol Hill, singing "I am only a bill. . . " comes to mind.

Article I, Section 8 is a list of powers given to the U.S. Congress. Since Congress is the only part of the federal government that has been vested with the power to make law (Article I, Section 1), that would make Article I, Section 8 a list of the powers given to the federal government. Amendments can give the federal government additional powers, but must be ratified by 3/4 of the States first.

Except where given by amendment, Article I, Section 8 is the sole list of powers the federal government is authorized to possess. As per Amendment 10, any power not listed in Article I, Section 8 (or in an amendment), nor prohibited to the States, is a power that belongs to the States. This means that the federal government is limited to the powers listed in Article I, Section 8 (or an amendment).

You will also notice that each power listed in Article I, Section 8, has something to do with protecting, or promoting, the union. That would make since, considering the primary reason for the formation of the federal government, as listed in the Preamble, was to form a more perfect union.

Article I, Section 8, Clause 1: . . . We Will Discuss Each Clause We Can Get To In Depth Tonight!






Article I, Section 8, Clause 1:

The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

Key Words:

Tax: Money compulsorily levied by government authority on individuals, property, businesses, etc.

Duty: A tax levied by a government on the import or export of goods.

Imposts: A tax, especially an import duty, tax levied on imports or exports.

Excise: Taxes on the manufacture, sale, or consumption of goods, or upon licenses to pursue certain occupations, or upon corporate privileges. In current usage covers about everything besides income taxes.

The Founding Fathers allowed the federal government to tax just about anything they wanted, as long as they did not tax the individuals directly.

Uniform: Every tax was to be treated the same within a jurisdiction (same tax rate, etc.). Tea arriving at the port of Charleston would need to have the same rate of federal duties as tea arriving at the port of Baltimore.




Beyond that, interpretation gets very, very complex and there seem to be a lot of court cases on whether a tax violates this clause or not. I think the Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was to get around the problem of the income tax not being uniform in some persons’ eyes, i.e., it is apportioned based on income, which varies, rather than strictly on numbers of persons from the census. Also involved was the complicated issue of “direct” (applied to all instances of a good or service) versus “indirect” (applied sort of to a potential, like a licensing fee) taxes. Whether one interpreted the income tax as one or the other affected whether it violated the uniformity clause. However, all this gets into legal areas in which AP is not an expert, so you’re forbidden to quote me! You might want to check if the Law Library has an Answer Person (or perhaps a friendly reference librarian).

Thursday, August 5, 2010

Article I, Sections 4-7; Executive Comparison; Executive Orders; Recent Judicial Activism That Violates Article III

Constitution Study, Temecula CA, August 5, 2010 with Douglas V. Gibbs

Article I, Sections 4-7; Executive Comparison; Executive Orders; Recent Judicial Activism That Violates Article III

Article I, Section 4 addresses elections, and assembly of the U.S. Congress (both Houses).

Article I, Section 5 addresses the internal rules of the Houses of the U.S. Congress.

Article I, Section 6 addresses compensation for members of Congress, and all rules associated with compensation.

Article I, Section 7 addresses bills, and the process of such bills becoming law.


The powers provided to the Executive Branch are very different than to the Congress, and does not allow the Executive Branch to make law in any way. The office is primarily tasked with protecting the union.


Executive Orders:

Executive Orders are not mentioned in the U.S. Constitution. Many believe that executive orders, in addition to the functions of modifying how an executive branch department or agency does its job (rule change), or to issue a proclamation, can modify existing law. Modifying law, however, would need to accompany the authority to make law, and that authority rests solely with the Legislative Branch. Therefore, any executive order that modifies the law is unconstitutional. Article I, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution grants to the Congress all legislative powers, therefore, the Executive and Judicial branches cannot make law, repeal law, strike down law, or modify law. Only Congress can.

Executive Orders are nothing new, for George Washington issued several Presidential Proclamations. Executive Orders and Proclamations, once again, are not law, but they do sometimes have the effect of statutes. A typical modern Proclamation might declare a day to be in someone's honor.

The Emancipation Proclamation had a broader effect, but did not free the slaves. The Emancipation Proclamation was not a law. It was a proclamation. It did change the course of the war, proclaiming the Civil War to be all about slavery, which encouraged the European Nations to step back in regards to their support of the Confederacy.

In line with that, we have often seen Executive Orders instruct the government to do no business with a country we are at war with. Executive orders are subject to judicial review, and can be declared unconstitutional. But since the executive orders hold no power over law, we can simply refuse to follow unconstitutional Executive Orders if we wish. Congress can refuse to follow Executive Orders that modify law, as well, since the Legislative branch alone is tasked with making law. Problem is, Congress has not been functioning in accordance with the U.S. Constitution, and has been allowing the Executive branch to wield more power.

This is why November is so important. We need to make sure that we vote into Congress representatives that understand the U.S. Constitution, or else Obama will continue his attempt to make Congress irrelevant, and will continue to pursue a course of making the Executive branch more powerful than our Founding Fathers ever intended it to be.

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Recently, federal judges in district courts made rulings on the Immigration Law in Arizona, and Proposition 8 in California. The attached articles explain:

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California Proposition 8 Declared Unconstitutional is Unconstitutional

By Douglas V. Gibbs

Proposition 8 in California was approved by voters in November of 2008. The new amendment to the California State Constitution dictates, “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.” A pair of gay couples sued, stating that the state constitutional amendment "deprives them of due process and of equal protection of the laws contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment and that its enforcement by state officials violates 42 USC § 1983.

U.S. Code Title 42, Section 1983 is legislation put into place in accordance with the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief U.S. District Judge Vaughn Walker, a lower court federal judge, made his ruling on the case today, and came to the conclusion that Proposition 8 is unconstitutional, claiming it violates the civil rights of those that exhibit gay behavior.

There are a number of issues regarding this issue and the U.S. Constitution. Not only is marriage a state issue, which means this case has no business in the federal courts, but also the decision by Judge Walker creates a contradiction in the court system.

A few weeks ago U.S. District Judge Joseph Tauro struck down the federal Defense of Marriage Act, indicating that the law "interferes with the right of a state to define marriage."

So which is it? The Left uses Case Law to define the Constitution, rather than the text of the founding document, and they use precedent law as their guiding light. Yet, the precedent law in place by Judge Tauro doesn't matter to Judge Walker. And how lawless does it make our system if two judges can disagree on whether definition of marriage is a state issue, and the Democrats agree with both?

On top of that, the courts claim they are enforcing the 14th Amendment. The amendment was designed to ensure that the emancipated slaves received the same rights and privileges as whites. The intent of the amendment is race, not behavior. If it is applied to behavior, such as the sexual behavior of homosexuals, how long before kleptomaniacs use it to justify their behavior, or pedophiles use it to justify their behavior, or polygamists use it to justify their behavior? Where would it stop?

One must also consider that the 14th Amendment ends with the words "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Yet, what we are seeing is the judiciary trying to enforce it.

A conflict of interest also exists in this case. Judge Walker is gay, so of course he is going to rule against Proposition 8.

What we are seeing is judges ruling based on personal opinion, or political agenda, rather than the law of the land. How is that the rule of law?

The losers of this ruling will appeal, and when the case goes to the next level, it will be appealed again by whichever group loses. Ultimately, this case will go to the Supreme Court, and with it, state sovereignty will go on trial. The real question is, will the Supreme Court apply the law, or act lawless as well?

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Judge Bolton Blocking Parts of Arizona Law Unconstitutional

By Douglas V. Gibbs

We know that the Democrats could care less about the U.S. Constitution. They hold case law higher than the law of the land. In fact, sometimes I am not even sure they have read the Constitution in the first place.

A great example of how ignorant these bastards are when it comes to the Constitution is Judge Bolton's decision to strike down parts of Arizona's Immigration Law (SB 1070).

It is bad enough that the federal government is suing a State government. It is worse that the reason for the lawsuit is that the federal government is angry that the State of Arizona is willing to enforce the law. . . law that the federal government, many folks believe, is supposed to be enforcing themselves.

Well, according to the U.S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 4, the federal government "shall protect each [State] from invasion."

As for the enforcement question, if one reads the Constitution, the federal government is not granted the authority to enforce immigration law (aside from sealing the border to protect us from invasion) anywhere in the text of the document. The 10th Amendment states that if an issue is not a federal authority, nor prohibited to the States, the authority belongs to the States. Therefore, enforcing immigration law at the State level is not only Constitutional, it is their responsibility.

The Constitution, when it comes to this lawsuit, comes to the rescue again in Article III. In the Ninth Circuit Court, which is an inferior federal court, Judge Susan R. Bolton struck down parts of the Arizona immigration law. Problem is, she didn't even have the Constitutional authority to hear the case in the first place.

Article III, Sec. 2, clause 2 says:

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction…

“Original” jurisdiction means the power to conduct the “trial” of the case (as opposed to hearing an appeal from the judgment of a lower court), meaning it should bypass all of the lower courts, and jump right up to the U.S. Supreme Court, simply because the State of Arizona is one of the parties in the case.

Sadly, this not only proves that Bolton either does not understand the U.S. Constitution, or is blatantly ignoring it, but that Attorney General Eric Holder, who filed the case in a court that does not have jurisdiction to hear it in the first place, also is either ignorant of the Constitution, or is circumventing it as well.

Jan Brewer, if she understands State Sovereignty, and the U.S. Constitution as I believe she does, now has a fantastic avenue to pursue. She can file a Petition for Removal before federal district court Judge Susan R. Bolton demanding that the case be removed to the Supreme Court on the ground that under Art. III, Sec. 2, clause 2, U.S. Constitution, only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to conduct the trial of this case.

Then, if Judge Bolton denies the Petition for Removal (and as a liberal she probably would), Governor Brewer should then file a Petition for Writ of Mandamus (an order to a lower court to do something correctly) in the U.S. Supreme Court asking that high court to order Judge Bolton to transfer the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.

The federal district court judge has unconstitutionally taken a case the U.S. Constitution prohibits the lower court from hearing, and that is a usurpation of power.

Let's hope Governor Brewer is also aware of this.

Thursday, July 29, 2010

Article I, Section 3 - The U.S. Senate (Outline)

July 29, 2010 Temecula Constitution Study, Faith Armory, 27498 Enterprise Cir. W. #2 with Douglas V. Gibbs

U.S. Constitution: Article I, Section 3 - The U.S. Senate

Key Points:

- Two per State

- Six year terms

- Divided into three classes for elections

- Appointed by State Legislatures (changed by 17th Amendment), Temporary appointments by Governor if Legislature recessed

- Minimum Age of Thirty of serve

- Nine Years Citizen

- Inhabitant of State for which chosen when elected

- Vice President is President of the Senate

- Choose own officers

- Sole power to try all Impeachments (House has sole power to impeach)

Thursday, July 22, 2010

Article I, Sections 1 and 2 Outline

July 22, 2010 Constitution Study Group at Faith Armory, 27498 Enterprise Cir. W. #2, Temecula, California

Article I, Sections 1 and 2.

Section 1 - U.S. Congress, grants powers to legislative branch, sets up State Sovereignty.

Section 2 (House of Representatives) - Key Points:

- Representatives shall be chosen every second year; reasoning behind this decision.

- House of Representatives belongs to the people, giving the people representation through the largest branch of the U.S. Legislature.

- Electors (voters) must be qualified to vote; would Founding Fathers approve of requiring ID at polling place?

- Representative must be at least 25 years of age.

- Representative must be minimum 7 year citizen.

- Representative must inhabit State representing when elected.

- 3/5s did not mean the Founding Fathers believed blacks are less than a whole person. . . so why did they use that fraction?

- Enumeration (census) every 10 years, rules by Congress.

- Shall not exceed 1 Representative per every 30,000. . . what does that mean?

- No less than 1 Representative per State.

- Vacancies will be filled with special elections authorized by State governor.

- House chooses Speaker.

- The House of Representatives holding the purse strings is not listed in this section, the authority is listed in Section 7, which will be discussed at a later date.

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We will also have a discussion regarding State Sovereignty, and how the idea uses Free Market principles to allow the States to compete against one another.

Thursday, July 15, 2010

In the Beginning Was the Preamble; The Fate of Gun Rights

Thursday, July 15, 2010

Week 11 - Temecula Constitution Study with Douglas V. Gibbs
Topic: In the Beginning there was the Preamble; The fate of gun rights

Question 1: Is State Sovereignty an important aspect of the U.S. Constitution?

Question 2: Does the Authorities listed in the U.S. Constitution only apply to the Federal Government?

Question 3: Is the right to bear arms an individual right, or a collective right?

Question 4: Is McDonald v. Chicago a victory for gun rights?

The Chicago handgun ban case that went to the Supreme Court is being seen as a major victory for those supporting gun rights. I am here to tell you that it was not only not a victory, but that it sets the table for the federal government to take away the individual gun rights.

The Heller v. Washington DC case established that the right to bear arms is an individual right, not a collective right.

The McDonald v. Chicago case established that the 2nd Amendment applies to the States as well as the federal government.

The upside, people say, is that means cities and states cannot ban guns.

If you want your gun rights protected at the State level that is what the State Constitution is for.

Now that the Supreme Court has determined that the 2nd Amendment applies to the States, all firearms legislation at the State level is null and void. Only the 2nd Amendment applies. As a result, the federal government is dictating to the states that they must allow people to keep and bear arms.

But if the federal government can give you your rights, they can take them away - hence the reason for state sovereignty, and why the Bill of Rights were originally intended not to apply to the States, but to the Federal Government only.

The change of only one justic on the U.S. Supreme Court could overturn the Heller case, change the findings to say that gun ownership is a collective right, use the McDonald case as precedent to show the 2nd Amendment applies to the states, and take away the firearms of every individual, unless they are a part of an approved "collective" organization or group.

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Special Thanks to

Faith Armory
27498 Enterprise Cir. W. #2
Temecula, CA 92590
www.faitharmory.com

Thursday, July 8, 2010

Federal Lawsuit Against Arizona's Immigration Law, The Supremacy Clause (Article VI, Section 2)

Week 10, July 8, 2010 - - -
The Constitution Is The Solution Constitution Study, Temecula, CA

Topic: Federal Lawsuit Against Arizona’s Immigration Law,
The Supremacy Clause (Article VI, Section 2)

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Arizona’s Immigration Law, A Federal Lawsuit, and The Supremacy Clause

By Douglas V. Gibbs

The primary argument by the federal government in their lawsuit against Arizona will be Article VI, Section 2, also known as The Supremacy Clause, has been violated by the State of Arizona.

Every Thursday evening I lead a study group on the U.S. Constitution in Temecula, California at Faith Armory's classroom (27498 Enterprise Cir. W #2). For the first nine weeks we have bounced around quite a bit because the news of the week brings up a new constitutional topic. I planned to begin marching down Article I tonight, but right on schedule, the wide wide world of news has provided yet another topic for us to tackle.

This week, thanks to the federal lawsuit against Arizona and SB 1070 (a.k.a. Arizona's "controversial" immigration law), we will discuss The Supremacy Clause.

We are taught in school that federal law supersedes state law in all cases, and that federal courts are supreme over state courts. Therefore, if the federal government has a law on the books, and a state, or city, passes a law that contradicts that federal law, the federal government can override that local law, and strike it down as unconstitutional based on The Supremacy Clause.

An example of the federal government acting upon the above assumption is the medical marijuana laws in California. Though I do not agree with the legalization of marijuana, even for medicinal purposes, the actual constitutional legality of the issue illustrates my point quite well.

California passed a law legalizing marijuana for medicinal purposes, but federal law has marijuana as being illegal in all applications. Therefore, using the authority of the federal government based on the Supremacy Clause, federal agents (or at least until recently) have been raiding and shutting down medical marijuana labs in California.

Deception always begins with a kernel of truth.

The Supremacy Clause applies to federal laws that are constitutionally authorized. No place in the Constitution is the federal government given the authority to dictate to states what they can legislate regarding drugs. Therefore, federal drug laws are unconstitutional. As a result, California's medical marijuana laws are constitutional because they are not contrary to any constitutionally authorized federal laws.

"Contrary" is a key word in the Article VI, Section 2, when applied to the federal lawsuit against Arizona.

Language plays an important part in the Constitution, and The Supremacy Clause is no different. The clause indicates that state laws cannot be contrary to constitutionally authorized federal laws. For example, Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 states that it is the job of the U.S. Congress to establish an uniform rule of naturalization. The word "uniform" means that the rules for naturalization must apply to all immigrants, and to all states, the same way. If a state was to then pass a law that granted citizenship through the naturalization process in a way not consistent with federal law, the State would be guilty of violating the Supremacy Clause.

Assuming, for just a moment, that the federal government has complete authority over immigration, Arizona's law would then need to be identical to federal law. And in most ways, the Arizona law is similar to federal law. However, if Arizona was to follow the federal government's recommendation, and truly pass a law completely in line with federal law, Arizona would remove its text that disallows racial profiling because the federal law does not contain such protections.

The question, however, is if enforcing immigration laws is even a federal authority in the first place. After all, as we saw in Article I, Section 8, Clause 4, the federal government is only given the authority to "establish" the rule for "naturalization." One could reason that since the U.S. Constitution allows Congress authority over naturalization, it would be reasonable to assume the federal government could also determine how those same immigrants can come into our country in the first place. However, that is not what the Constitution says. It is very specific that it is up to the federal government to "establish" naturalization rules. It says nothing about applying those rules, or enforcing those rules.

Immigration is mentioned more specifically elsewhere in the U.S. Constitution, but the word "migration" is used instead. The word appears in Article I, Section 9, Clause 1. The clause reads: The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.

The clause was designed to be a compromise so that the southern states would be willing to ratify the Constitution. There was a strong desire by many of the founders to abolish slavery at the onset, but for economic and agricultural reasons, many of the Founding Fathers realized that the new nation would not be able to immediately abolish slavery. Besides, to do so would be to lose the votes by the states from Maryland down to Georgia when it came to ratifying the Constitution. However, to take no action toward abolishing slavery would risk losing the votes of States pushing for the abolition of slavery. The Founding Fathers also had to take into consideration state sovereignty. To resolve their dilemma, they placed in the Constitution a mechanism that would allow Congress to prohibit the import of slaves from outside the country, but put a twenty year delay on it to reassure the southern states that the move was not immediate.

On January 1, 1808, the U.S. Congress passed a law prohibiting the import of slaves, keeping in line with Article I, Section 9, Clause 1.

However, notice that the word "migration" is also in that clause. Migration is another word for "immigration." Migration, like the importation of slaves, could not be prohibited by the Congress prior to 1808. This means immigration enforcement was completely up to the States. After 1808, Congress was given the authority to prohibit immigration, but once again, there is no language in the clause specifically regarding enforcement.

Current federal law does address the issue of illegal immigration quite succinctly.

U.S. Code TITLE 8 > CHAPTER 12 > SUBCHAPTER II > Part VIII > § 1324 addresses the harboring of illegal aliens (considering it a felony to conceal or shelter illegal aliens), the unlawful employment of aliens, document fraud, and civil penalties for an alien's failure to depart from the United States.

TITLE 8 > CHAPTER 12 > SUBCHAPTER II > Part VIII > § 1325 addresses improper entry by an illegal alien, considering illegal entry into the United States without inspection as being a misdemeanor. Repeated illegal entry is a felony.

As allowed by Article I, Section 9, Clause 1, the U.S. Code contains laws prohibiting illegal entry into the United States.

It would seem reasonable that the federal government should be tasked with the duty of enforcing their own laws, but once again, the Constitution does not indicate upon whom the duty of enforcement lies. Therefore, it is fair to assess that the duties of enforcement lies in the hands of each enforcement agency, from the federal level, all the way down to the municipal level.

Cities and States enforcing federal law is nothing new. For example, bank robbery is a federal crime, but the local police does not wait for a representative from a federal agency to appear before taking chase. It is perfectly acceptable for local authorities to enforce federal law in that instance.

So why should immigration enforcement be any different?

The immigration issue ultimately leads to the border, which is where the U.S. Constitution is more specific when it comes to the duties of the federal government.

Article IV, Section 4 reads: The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against invasion. . .

Invasion is defined as "forceful entry, to encroach or intrude on, violate; to overrun as if by invading; infest; to enter and permeate, especially harmfully."

Illegal immigration can easily be categorized as being an invasion. To stop the invasion, the federal government must seal the border. Therefore, the federal government is acting unconstitutionally when it does not protect the border from invasion by illegal aliens.

Though I do not believe case law is constitutional, I would also like to remind the leftists who love to rely on precedent law that there is also judicial precedents that support local enforcement of immigration laws. One example is a 9th Circuit Court case in 1983 (Gonzales v. City of Peoria) that determined "states and local police do have the authority to make immigration arrests and to assist the federal government in enforcing federal immigration laws."

http://openjurist.org/722/f2d/468/gonzales-v-city-of-peoria

The CRS Report for Congress - Enforcing Immigration Law: The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement dated March 11, 2004 (http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/P48.pdf) also supports that local law enforcement may enforce immigration law, and in the reports findings, such authority exists also for purposes of national security. The report states: "Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act of 2003 (CLEAR Act; H.R. 2671) and the Homeland Security Enhancement Act of 2003 (S. 1906) would enhance the role of state and local officials in the enforcement of immigration law...The legislative proposals that have been introduced, however, would appear to expand the role of state and local law enforcement agencies in the civil enforcement aspects of the INA."

It is the duty of the federal government to protect this nation from foreign invasion, and it is well within the rights of local agencies to enforce immigration laws within their jurisdiction. In relation to the Supremacy Clause, I do not believe it applies in this case, but even if it did, Arizona's law would not violate the Supremacy Clause because it does not run contrary to federal legislation that addresses immigration. In fact, federal law is much more stringent than Arizona's SB 1070, including the fact that federal law does not prohibit the use of racial profiling, while Arizona's law has specific text that not only prohibits racial profiling, but requires officers to provide evidence for their reasonable suspicion in order to ensure racial profiling was not used.

If by all legal standards, and by the language of U.S. Constitution, federal law, and Arizona's immigration law, the federal lawsuit against Arizona's immigration law has no validity, then one must ask, "Why has the federal government brought this lawsuit against Arizona?"

The answer is clear. The lawsuit is politically motivated, designed to garner sympathy for the federal government from the Hispanic community. In other words, the lawsuit is a feeble attempt to gather a few more voters in the face of the November elections, in which it looks like the Democrats will lose many seats.

An act of desperation at the expense of the law.

-- Political Pistachio Conservative News and Commentary



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Special Thanks to:

Faith Armory
27498 Enterprise Circle West, #2
Temecula, California 92590
951-699-7500
www.faitharmory.com
Info@faitharmory.com

Thursday, July 1, 2010

2nd Amendment: McDonald v. Chicago; Article I Outline

Constitution Study with Douglas V. Gibbs Week 09: July 1, 2010
Topics:

McDonald ET AL. v. City of Chicago, Illinois, ET AL. - Supreme Court 5-4 Decision Disallowing Chicago’s handgun ban; United States Supreme Court uses 14th Amendment to apply the 2nd Amendment to the States.

U.S. Constitution, Article I


McDonald v. City of Chicago:

The 5-4 Decision holds that the 2nd Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms in all cities and States. The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that originally the 2nd Amendment applied only to the Federal Government, but it is in the opinion of the court that the 14th Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights, therefore applying those amendments, and more specifically the 2nd Amendment, to the States.

I believe that the U.S. Constitution applies to the federal government except where specifically noted otherwise.

After the decision many people called me saying, “We won!”

I said, "I am not so sure."

I am uneasy anytime the federal government tells a city or state what they have to do. I am happy about the protection of gun rights, but that does not mean I am in agreement with the constitutional angle used.

Let me put it this way. If we give the federal government the right to tell cities they have to allow gun ownership, what stops them from doing the opposite later? This case creates a precedent of allowing the federal government to dictate to the states and cities what they have to do, and in that I recognize a great danger to state sovereignty.

Article I of the U.S. Constitution - The Legislative Branch

Section 1: Establishes the Legislative Branch

Section 2: U.S. House of Representatives

Section 3: U.S. Senate

Section 4: Elections, Sessions

Section 5: Elections, Rules of Proceedings

Section 6: Compensation and Ethics

Section 7: Bills

Section 8: Federal Authorities

Section 9: Federal Prohibitions

Section 10: State Prohibitions


Other pages found at:
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20100628/pl_nm/us_usa_guns_2/print
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-1521.pdf

Thursday, June 24, 2010

24th Amendment, Implied Law, Open Primaries, Bill of Attainder

Constitution Study with Douglas V. Gibbs
Thursday, June 24, 2010
24th Amendment, Implied Law, Open Primaries; Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 - Bill of Attainder

Supporters of Open Primaries contend that Closed Primaries are in violation of the 24th Amendment because limiting who can vote in a primary by party membership is a poll tax as per implied law.

Poll Tax: NOUN: A tax levied on people rather than on property, often as a requirement for voting.

A poll tax is a uniformed tax levied on every adult in the community. Poll taxes have their roots in ancient tax systems and have been criticized as an unfair burden on the poor. Historically, in the U.S., they were enacted in the South as a prerequisite for voting disfranchising many African Americans and poor whites.

The 24th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution ratified in 1964 that made it illegal for a state to use payment to all taxes as a requirement to vote in national elections. Few blacks could vote because they had a little money. The poll tax to vote was $1.50. A woman decided to take the poll tax issue to court. In October 1965, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Evelyn T. Butts' appeal. In 1966 the Supreme Court of the United States declared Poll Taxes unconstitutional.

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A recent shake-down by the Obama administration of British Petroleum forced the oil company to take responsibility for their failure regarding the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico at the Deepwater Horizon rig. The White House has declared BP to be guilty of negligence, is the responsible party, and non-compliance with the demands of the Obama administration will not be tolerated.

Is the meeting between Obama and the BP CEO that resulted in a $20 billion fund paid out by BP as a punishment for their negligence constitutional?

The Constitution is very specific, and calls such action a Bill of Attainder. A Bill of Attainder is by definition a "legislative act which declares a named person guilty of a crime, particularly treason." Such bills are prohibited by Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution.

A bill of attainder (also known as an act or writ of attainder) is an act of the legislature declaring a person or group of persons guilty of some crime and punishing them without the benefit of a trial.

Bills of attainder find their history in connection to America's disdain for such an action in 18th century England. Bills of attainder were also applied to the British colonies. Anger about bills of attainder was one of the motivations for the American Revolution. The colonists considered bills of attainder an injustice. Later debate, however, arose when the American Colonies used bills of attainder themselves to confiscate the property of British loyalists (called Tories) during the revolution. The American dissatisfaction with attainder laws motivated the prohibition of bills of attainder in the Constitution.

The U.S. Constitution forbids bills of attainder under Article I, Section 9. The colonists considered bills of an excess or abuse of the British monarchy and parliament. Attainder as such was also a legal consequence of convictions in courts of law, but this ceased to be a part of punishment in 1870. The provision forbidding state law bills of attainder reflects the importance that the framers attached to this issue, since the unamended constitution imposes very few restrictions on state governments' power. (Article I, Section 10, Clause 1)

Two purposes are served by the presence of the clauses forbidding attainder laws. The attainder laws reinforce the separation of powers, by forbidding the legislature to perform judicial functions - since the outcome of any such acts of legislature would of necessity take the form of a bill of attainder. Also, the clauses embody the concept of due process, which was later reinforced by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.

Up until 2002, only five acts of Congress had ever been overturned on bill of attainder grounds. The Elizabeth Morgan Act was overturned in 2003 as a bill of attainder. many suggested that the Palm Sunday Compromise in the case of Terri Schiavo was also a bill of attainder. The cases of U.S. v. Brown, U.S. v. Lovett, and In re Yung Sing Hee establish bills of pains and penalties as punishment without trial, and included within the prohibitions of bills of attainder. The precedent that best reflects most of the original intention of the mandates is from Cummings v. Missouri. It states a bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial and includes any legislative act which takes away the life, liberty or property of a particular named or easily ascertainable person or group of persons because the legislature thinks them guilty of conduct which deserves punishment.

U.S. v. Lovett was a case historically relevant to taking away pay checks of government workers Congress could accuse of being Communists. This was an asset forfeiture case. It states: Legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a trial, are 'bills of attainder' prohibited under this clause.

a Special Thanks to:

Faith Armory, 27498 Enterprise Cir W #2, Temecula, CA 92562
951-699-7500, www.faitharmory.com - For providing us with a classroom to meet in.

Thursday, June 17, 2010

The Pledge of Allegiance

Constitution Study, June 17, 2010
The Pledge of Allegiance

"I pledge allegiance to the Flag
Of the United States of America,
And to the Republic for which it stands:
One Nation under God, indivisible,
with Liberty and Justice for all"

The Pledge of Allegiance is a traditional oath of loyalty to the United States of America. It was written in 1892 by Francis Bellamy, a Baptist minister and socialist.

In the United States, the Pledge of Allegiance is recited on many formal occasions, including at the beginning of the school day, and the opening of certain kinds of meetings. When the Pledge is recited, civilians face the Flag and place their right hands over their hearts. Men remove any non-religious headdress and hold it in the right hand. Military personnel in uniform remain silent and salute the flag. Under many public circumstances, in a display of patriotism, the Pledge will be followed with the singing of "America the Beautiful" and the National Anthem, "The Star Spangled Banner".

The phrase "under God" was added in 1954, by a bill signed into law by President Eisenhower on June 14, 1954 (Flag Day), largely driven by the lobbying of the Knights of Columbus, as a means of differentiating America from the "godless" Communists of the USSR.

Bellamy wrote the Pledge in the hopes that it would create a sense of nationalism in America, and convince her to adopt the principles of socialism, a concept akin to his cousin’s (Edward Bellamy) writings regarding utopianism.

The original "Pledge of Allegiance" was published in the September 8 issue of the popular children's magazine The Youth's Companion as part of the National Public-School Celebration of Columbus Day, a celebration of the 400th anniversary of Christopher Columbus's discovery of America. The event was conceived and promoted by James B. Upham, a marketer for the magazine, in a campaign to encourage patriotism and the display of the American flag in public schools.

Bellamy's original Pledge read as follows:

I pledge allegiance to my Flag and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

President Benjamin Harrison’s proclamation ensured the Pledge was first used in public schools on October 12, 1892, during Columbus Day observances. Bellamy hoped the pledge would involve children across the country in a large demonstration of national solidarity and nationalism.

In 1923 the National Flag Conference called for the words "my Flag" to be changed to "the Flag of the United States", for the benefit of new immigrants. The words "of America" were added a year later. The United States Congress officially recognized the Pledge as the official national pledge on June 22, 1942.

The Pledge stirred controversy, and violence, when in the 1940 the Supreme Court decision, in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, it was ruled that students in public schools could be compelled to swear the Pledge. The ruling intended to ensure the Pledge was recited, even though Jehovah's Witnesses like the defendants in that case who considered the flag salute to be idolatry. A rash of mob violence and intimidation against Jehovah's Witnesses followed the ruling. In 1943 the Supreme Court reversed its decision, ruling in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette that "compulsory unification of opinion" violated the First Amendment.

The right hand over the heart was not the original salute to the flag. Though some schools used a “right hand, palm down, across the chest” salute, the salute that Bellamy created for the Pledge, adopted in 1892, and known as the Bellamy salute, started with the hand outstretched toward the flag, palm down, and ended with the palm up. The similarity between the Bellamy salute and the Nazi salute decades later encouraged President Franklin D. Roosevelt to institute the hand-over-the-heart gesture as the salute to be rendered by civilians during the Pledge of Allegiance and the national anthem in the United States, instead of the Bellamy salute. Removal of the Bellamy salute occurred on December 22, 1942, when Congress amended the Flag Code language first passed into law on June 22, 1942.

The words "under God" being added to the Pledge was initiated by Louis A. Bowman, a Chaplain of the Illinois Society of the Sons of the American Revolution. At a meeting on February 12, 1948 of the organization, Lincoln's Birthday, Bowman led the Society in swearing the Pledge with the two words added, "under God." Bowman repeated his revised version of the Pledge at other meetings as well.

In 1951, the Knights of Columbus, also began including the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance. On April 30, 1951, in New York City, the Board of Directors of the Knights of Columbus adopted a resolution to amend the text of their Pledge of Allegiance to include the words "under God" after the words "one nation." Over the next two years, the idea spread throughout Knights of Columbus organizations nationwide. On August 21, 1952, the Supreme Council of the Knights of Columbus at its annual meeting adopted a resolution urging that the change be made universal. Copies of their resolution resolution were sent to the President, the Vice President (as Presiding Officer of the Senate) and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Early attempts to change the Pledge nationally failed.

In 1952, Holger Christian Langmack wrote a letter to President Truman suggesting the inclusion of "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance. Mr. Langmack was a Danish philosopher and educator who came to America in 1911. He was one of the originators of the Prayer Breakfast and a religious leader in Washington, D.C. President Truman met with him along with several others to discuss the inclusion of "under God". At the suggestion of a correspondent, Representative Louis C. Rabaut of Michigan sponsored a resolution to add the words "under God" to the Pledge in 1953, but the resolution failed.

Prior to February 1954, no attempt to get the Pledge officially amended succeeded. The final successful push came from George MacPherson Docherty. After George MacPherson Docherty delivered a sermon based on the Gettysburg Address titled "A New Birth of Freedom," in which he argued that the nation's might lay not in arms but its spirit and higher purpose, President Eisenhower, though raised a Jehovah's Witness, but had been baptized a Presbyterian just a year before, responded enthusiastically to Docherty in a conversation following the service. Eisenhower acted on his suggestion the next day and on February 8, 1954, Rep. Charles Oakman (R-Mich.), introduced a bill to that effect. Congress passed the necessary legislation and Eisenhower signed the bill into law on Flag Day, June 14, 1954. The phrase "under God" was incorporated into the Pledge of Allegiance June 14, 1954, by a Joint Resolution of Congress amending §7 of the Flag Code enacted in 1942.


Key Words:

Allegiance: Loyalty to a person, cause, nation, etc.

Communism: Theoretical economic system characterized by collective ownership of property and the organization of labor for the common advantage of all members.

Communist: Member of a movement or political party that advocates communism.

Idolatry: Worship of idols.

Loyalty: A feeling or attitude of devoted attachment or affection.
Nationalism: Devotion to one’s nation, love of one’s government.

Oath: A solemn formal declaration or promise, often calling on God. Something declared or promised.

Patriotism: Love of and devotion to one’s country.

Socialism: The stage in Marxist theory between Capitalism and Communism.

Socialist: An advocate of the theory of social organization in which the means of producing and distributing goods is owned collectively or by a centralized government that often plans and controls the economy.

Utopianism: Social theory of principles of an ideally perfect place in its social, political, and moral aspects.


Douglas V. Gibbs
www.politicalpistachio.com


Special Thanks to for letting us use their classroom:

Faith Armory, 27498 Enterprise Cir. W. #2, Temecula, CA

Thursday, June 10, 2010

The Branches of Government and the Political Spectrum

(click image to enlarge)


Constitution Study - The Branches of Government and the Political Spectrum
June 10, 2010

Article I of the United States Constitution establishes the first of the three branches of the U.S. Government, the Legislative Branch. Article II establishes the Executive Branch. Article III establishes the Judicial Branch. Amendments IX and X confirms the limiting nature of the Constitution, and the 11th Amendment places more limits on the judiciary.

The U.S. Constitution is a contract between the States and the federal government. The agreement allows the existence of the federal government so that it may serve the States as a protective mechanism in regards to the union. The authorities of the federal government are few, and the Constitution is written in such a way to limit the powers of the federal government, while promoting the sovereignty of the States.

Evidence of the limiting principles of the Constitution, aside from the text of the document itself, is contained in the numerous writings of the Founding Fathers, including, but not limited to:

- The Federalist Papers

- Madison's Notes on the Constitutional Convention

- John Taylor's New Views of the U.S. Constitution

- Various Letters written by the Founders

- Various Opinions written by the Founding Fathers, such as James Madison's veto of the Public Works bill of 1817

The arrangement of the branches of the government is also determined, and explained, by the U.S. Constitution, and the original writings of the patriots that forged this nation. By close study, it becomes apparent that the myth that states the three branches of government are three co-equal branches is a false teaching. The branches, in order of power, are also in line with the order provided in the first three articles of the U.S. Constitution.

Congress, or the Legislative Branch, holds the most power. They are given the power to impeach both President and Justices, override vetoes, ratify treaties (Senate), propose amendments, and in the case of the House of Representatives, defund policies or programs.

The President, his cabinet, and his supporting staff, or the Executive Branch, holds the second most power, with the authority to veto bills, wage war without the necessity of a declaration, and the ability to sign treaties.

The Judicial Branch, headed by the U.S. Supreme Court, is supposed to be the weakest of the three branches. Though they may rule on cases by applying the law (Constitution and appropriate law) to the cases, their allowance is supposed to be limited to cases that either name the federal government as one of the parties of the case, or cases that fall under the authority of the federal government as provided by the U.S. Constitution. Though Supreme Court Justices are given lifetime appointments, they can be impeached by Congress should the Justice be considered to have practiced bad behavior unbecoming of the court, or unlawful, in regards to the law.

Today's political viewpoint has perverted the original intent of the Founding Fathers, placing the Supreme Court as the most powerful branch, able to repeal law, interpret the Constitution, make law, and change the Constitution through the concepts of implied law, and precedent law.

Another false belief has emerged as well. We have been taught that federal law supersedes State law, and that federal courts supersede State courts - setting aside the State sovereignty the Founders fought so hard to protect.

Part of the deception regarding the American Form of Government has been fueled by the erroneous perception of the Political Spectrum. Today's worldview places Communism and Monarchies on the far left, Fascism and Nazism on the far right, and moderates closer to the center. In reality, the Political Spectrum in America is based more on the consideration of the amount of government. In such a model, the far left is 100% government. Left of center includes Monarchies, Oligarchies, Socialism, Fascism, Progressivism, Theocracies, and Hamiltonianism. To the far right is Anarchy, or 0% government. Right of center, but closer to the center than to anarchy, includes Republicanism, Conservatism, Libertarianism, and the U.S. Constitution.

The old style of the political spectrum used by the American Liberal is based on an old outdated political spectrum that originated in France just prior to the French Revolution. On the right of the assembly sat those that supported no change, supported the ruling monarchy, and supported the state church. The left was populated by those that demanded change through secular government that rejected a monarchy, but embraced a centralized government model.

Today's American Left is attempting to move America into the direction of a more centralized government, under the guise of the general will and democracy, which is a transitional government that historically always leads to a more centralized system that mirrors socialism, or other leftist systems of government.

The truth is out there. All one must ask is, "What Does The Constitution Say?"

Join us tonight at 6:00 pm in Temecula, California for our weekly Constitution Study - because We The People have the duty to restrain a government operating outside Constitutional boundaries. To facilitate our Constitutional rights we must understand what our powers are by discovering our American heritage and birthright.

The Constitution Study at 6:00 pm will be held at Faith Armory (next door to Birth Choice) at 27498 Enterprise Circle West in Temecula, California. Free Pocket Constitutions will be handed out to all attendees.

Join us in the cause of preserving our God-given Liberty, and restoring our Constitutional Republic. After all, if you don't defend Liberty, who will?

A special thanks to Faith Armory for providing the classroom for us to meet in each week. www.faitharmory.com























FEDERALIST No. 51
The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments
From the New York Packet.
Friday, February 8, 1788.
Alexander Hamilton or James Madison

To the People of the State of New York:

TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention.

In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them.

It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal.

But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State.
But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified. An absolute negative on the legislature appears, at first view, to be the natural defense with which the executive magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would be neither altogether safe nor alone sufficient. On ordinary occasions it might not be exerted with the requisite firmness, and on extraordinary occasions it might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own department?

If the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they be applied as a criterion to the several State constitutions, and to the federal Constitution it will be found that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with them, the former are infinitely less able to bear such a test.

There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting point of view.

First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.

Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government. This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican government, since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated: the best security, under the republican forms, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished: and consequently the stability and independence of some member of the government, the only other security, must be proportionately increased. Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradnally induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful. It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the REPUBLICAN CAUSE, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the FEDERAL PRINCIPLE.

PUBLIUS.



















New Views
OF THE
Constitution
OF THE
United States
by
JOHN TAYLOR

PREFACE
THAT many eminent and respectable men have ever preferred, and ever will prefer, a consolidated national government to our federal system; that the constitution, under the influence of this predilection, has been erroneously construed; that these constructions are rapidly advancing towards their end, whether it shall be consolidation or disunion; that they will become a source of excessive geographical discord; and that the happiness and prosperity of the United States will be greater under a federal than under a national government, in any form, are the opinions which have suggested the following treatise. If the survey taken of these subjects is not proportioned to their importance, it yet may not be devoid of novelty, nor wholly ineffectual towards attracting more publick attention towards a question involving a mass of consequences either very good or very bad.

SECTION I
The Meaning of Certain Primary Words
I shall attempt to ascertain the nature of our form of government, and the existence of a project to alter it. Principles and words are the disciplinarians of construction, but the latter require definitions to come at truth.

The word union is inexplicit. It may imply either a perfect consolidation; or an association for special purposes, reaching only stated objects, and limited by positive restrictions. Of civil unions, the matrimonial is the most intimate; and yet the parties to it are invested with separate and independent rights. The ancient union of the independent kingdoms of Spain, effected by marriage or conquest, left to each many local privileges. The union of England and Scotland, effected by compact, contains stipulations beyond the power of the united government to alter, especially that in relation to the religion of the latter kingdom. That between England and Ireland is a political consolidation. The latter kingdom did not obtain an establishment of the Roman Catholick religion. Had the majority of the people possessed free will, they would have reserved this local right; and the Roman Catholick religion, like the Presbyterian, would have been placed beyond the reach of the united representation in parliament; just as the reserved rights of the states are placed beyond the reach of our united representation in Congress; because political unions for special purposes, cannot be defeated by inferences from the form adopted for their execution. In order to determine whether the United States meant by the term union, to establish a supreme power or a limited association, we must commence our inquiry at their political birth, and accommodate our arguments with the principles they avowed in proclaiming their political existence. These are stated in the declaration of independence: "We the representatives of the United States of America, in general Congress assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world, for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the name and by the authority of the good people of these colonies, solemnly publish and declare, that these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states; and that as free and independent states, they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and do all other acts and things, which independent states may of right do." Such is the origin of our liberty, and the foundation of our form of government. The consolidating project ingeniously leaves unexamined the arguments suggested by this declaration, and commences its lectures at the end of the subject to be considered. If the declaration of independence is not obligatory, our intire political fabrick has lost its magna charta, and is without any solid foundation. But if it is the basis of our form of government, it is the true expositor of the principles and terms we have adopted.The word "united" is used in conjunction with the phrase "free and independent states," and this association recognises a compatibility between the sovereignty and the union of the several states. The regulation of commerce is enumerated among the rights of sovereignty, and this right having been exercised by each state under their first confederation, because it was not surrendered, is an evidence of what was meant by the sovereignty of the states, and a proof that the separate sovereignty of each, and not a consolidated sovereignty of all, was established by the declaration of independence. The same observation applies to the sovereign rights of the states, not surrendered by the existing federal constitution.Take from the states the political character they assumed by the declaration of independence, and they could not have united. To contract, to stipulate, to unite, are among the "acts and things which independent states may of right do." The first confederation or union recognises the compatibility between the union and the sovereignty of the states. The existing union adheres to the same idea, professes to establish a more perfect union of states created by the Declaration of Independence, and contains many provisions incapable of being executed except by state sovereignty. It uses the words "United States," taken by the first confederation from the declaration of independence, and transplanted from both these instruments, in which they are associated with positive assertions of the independence and sovereignty of each state; and therefore the last instrument, like the others, recognises the compatibility between the union and the sovereignty of the several states.
The notion that the "freedom and independence of the states" refers to a consolidation of states, admits of a perfect refutation. It would render the language of the declaration of independence ungrammatical, because had this been intended, it ought to have recognised the rights of sovereignty as residing in one consolidated state, and not in several states. It would have rendered the confederation unnecessary; because, had the declaration of independence invested a consolidation of states with a power to do "all acts and things which a free and independent state may of right do," there would not have existed the least reason for delegating powers to a federal Congress. It would have divested each province or state of the right to make and alter its own constitution and its own laws; and it would have converted the exercise of any sovereign power by a state, subsequently to the declaration of independence, into usurpation. The contemporary construction of the declaration of independence was completely adverse to the idea that it had conferred any sovereign power, whatever, upon a consolidation of states. Hence a confederation became necessary; and hence the several states exercised, among others, the sovereign powers of raising armies, imposing taxes, and regulating commerce. The language used in the declaration of independence was adopted and explained by the confederation framed in 1777. It is entitled a "perpetual union," its style was "The United States of America," and it declares that "each state retains its sovereignty." So far state sovereignty is explicitly recognised, and no idea existed that it had been lost by a union of states. Upon trial, it being discovered that the powers bestowed upon Congress by the first confederation, were insufficient "for their common defence and general welfare," the ends it expresses; another union was framed by the constitution of 1787, rendered more perfect by enlarging federal powers, and repeating the same words of "common defence and general welfare" as its chief ends. If this phrase was understood, as neither creating a supreme national government, nor extending the powers delegated by the confederation of 1777, it must have been also understood in the same sense when used in the constitution of 1787. Its meaning is ascertained by the tenth section of the latter instrument. The individual states are prohibited from exercising certain attributes of sovereignty, particularly those of making war, treaties, and regulating commerce, because, except for the prohibition, they would have retained them, as adjuncts of sovereignty. The prohibition is therefore a construction of this phrase, corresponding with the construction it received when used in the confederation of 1777, and uniting both instruments with the public opinion, that neither the word union, nor this specification of its objects, extended delegated powers, created a general government or supremacy, or deprived the states of any attributes of sovereignty except those prohibited.

The word consolidation, colloquially adopted, expresses an idea opposite to that universally supposed to be conveyed by a political union of sovereign and independent states, and inconsistent with limited powers, or positive restrictions. It implies a fusion of the state sovereignties into one mass, so that each would lose its individuality. Had this event taken place, the aggregate sovereignty would certainly have imbibed all the powers annexed to the materials of which it was compounded, and the several states would not have retained a single power. We must therefore either conclude that a consolidated sovereignty was established, or that every attribute of sovereignty remained with the states, except the attributes prohibited, because these prohibitions are the only rule by which those they surrendered can be distinguished from those they retained. Had a concentrated sovereignty or supremacy been contemplated by either of our three political instruments, it would have been expressed by consolidation or an equivalent word. As this was not the case at either era, the declaration of independence, the confederation of 1777, and the constitution of 1787, have used the same words and phrases to express the publick opinion; and if the Jesuit, construction, can extract a consolidated supremacy or sovereignty out of the last of these instruments, it must have been created by the two former.

The word Congress requires attention. It was adopted by the provinces, and the declaration of independence was framed "by the representatives of the United States in Congress assembled." The representative character, was common to the Congress of the provinces, of the states under the confederation of 1777, and of the states under the constitution of 1787; but neither this character, nor the intrinsick meaning of the word, were supposed to convey any powers until very lately. If the phrase "Congress of the United States," or the representative character of one branch of that body, had conveyed implied powers, it would have been useless to grant specified legislative powers to this "Congress of the United States" by the first article of the constitution. The numerous sovereign powers not granted by this article, must either pass by implication, or not pass at all. If they did not pass by this mode of conveyance, they remained with the states. The implication or inference is obviated by selecting the word "Congress" in preference to the words parliament or assembly, to the comprehensiveness of which the states had been accustomed. It was the precise word used to express a congregation of deputies from independent states or governments. In that sense it was adopted by the provinces, used in the confederation of 1777, and repeated in the constitution. No word could have been selected with equal felicity, to convey the idea contemplated by a federal system. It avoided the implications which the usual words parliament or assembly might have furnished, and demonstrated that a body of men invested with powers equivalent to those exercised by such denominations, was not intended to be established. And it intimated the independence of the several states as being similar to the independence of the several provinces of each other, as well as to that of distinct kingdoms. The assemblage of men which framed the constitution, was called "A convention of deputies from the states of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia." By what authority did the states appoint these deputies, if not in virtue of their respective sovereignties, existing in common with a "Congress of the United States?" If a Congress did not destroy the sovereignties of the states at that time, is it reasonable to suppose that the present "Congress of the United States" was constituted to destroy them? The deputies of the states in the convention, though representatives, could not have enacted a constitution, because it would have violated the limited powers which they received from state sovereignties; and in like manner, the deputies of the states now composing a Congress, though representatives, cannot exceed their powers. It is upon this principle, that Congress cannot alter the terms of the union.

The word "federal," also adopted into our political phraseology, is a national construction of the terms used in forming our system of government, comprising a definite expression of pub-lick opinion, that state sovereignties really exist. It implies a league between sovereign nations, has been so used by all classes of people from the commencement of our political existence down to this day, and is inapplicable to a nation consolidated under one sovereignty.

The meaning of the word "state" accords with that of the words associated with it. Used in reference to individuals, it comprises a great variety of circumstances, but in reference to the publick, it means a political community. Johnson thus expounds it, and adds, that it implies a republick, or a government not monarchical. What other word was more proper to describe the communities recognised by the declaration of independence, the union of 1777, and the union of 1787? Can the same word have been intended to convey an idea in the last, inconsistent with the idea it conveys in the two first instruments? Neither monarchy nor aristocracy would have fitted the case, and the word republick itself would have been exposed to uncertainties, with which the word state is not chargeable; because it has been applied to governments discordant with those which were established by our revolution. As no word more explicitly comprises the idea of a sovereign independent community; as it is used in conjunction with a declared sovereignty and independence; as it is retained by the union of 1787, and in all the operations of our governments; and as sovereign powers only could be reserved by states; there seems to be no sound argument by which it can be deprived of its intrinsick meaning, contrary to these positive constructions.

Against this concomitancy of interpretation, the consolidating school takes refuge under the word "people," and contends that it is susceptible of a meaning which inflicts upon many of its associates the character of nonsense, and deprives them of their right to assist in the construction of the constitution. Let us therefore endeavour to defend it against the aspersion of hostility to its best friends, and to save it from the crime of self-murder. In all ages metaphysicians have been so skilful in splitting principles, as to puzzle mankind in their search after truth; and morality itself would be lost by the minuteness of their dissections, except for the resistance of common sense, and the dictates of unsophisticated conscience. But the achievement of losing twenty-four sovereign states by the acuteness of construction, and getting rid of a people in each, by means of the word necessary to describe them, was reserved for the refined politicians of the present day; and is equivalent to the ingenuity of a fisherman, who should lose a whale by a definition of his name, which would destroy his qualities.

At the commencement of the revolutionary war, emergency dictated temporary expedients, and delayed the formal adoption of measures for constituting a people in each province. A Congress was therefore appointed by provincial legislatures, by one branch of these legislatures, or by districts in a province; but when disorder was exchanged for independence, it was appointed, and its powers were derived from the state governments, who were deemed sufficient to ratify the declaration of independence, because they represented a people circumscribed within each state territory. The same species of sanction was resorted to, for the ratification of both the union of 1777 and the union of 1787.The ratification of the first was to be made by "the legislatures of all the United States," and of the latter by "the conventions of nine states." The reference to their representatives in both cases, far from acknowledging that each state was without a people, acknowledged the contrary. The differences between the two modes of ratification, consisted in the distinction between the words "legislatures and conventions," and between the necessity for unanimity in one case, and the sufficiency of nine states in the other, to establish the proposed unions. In neither, could the object be effected by a majority of the people of the United States. Whatever may be the difference between the words legislatures and convention, in other cases, there is none in this, because both were representatives of the same people. Why did the first union require a unanimity of states? Because a people of each state had been created by the declaration of independence, invested with sovereignty, and therefore entitled to unite or not. Why were the ratifying nine states only to be united by the second? For the same reason; demonstrating, that as to the ratification of both, no distinction was made between legislatures and conventions; and that a concurrence or rejection of either, was considered as a sovereign act of a state people by their representatives. This principle is confirmed beyond all doubt, by the different modes in which men act when framing a constitution for a consolidated people, or creating a federal union between distinct states. In the first case, neither the consent of every individual, nor of every county, is necessary, because no individual possesses sovereign power, and because no county comprises a people politically independent. If there are thirteen counties in a state, and the deputies of four dissent from a constitution, it is yet obligatory upon all, because all are subject to the sovereign power of one people. The constitution of the United States was only obligatory upon the ratifying states, because each state comprised a sovereign people, and no people existed, invested with a sovereignty over the thirteen states. This consent, whether expressed by state legislatures or state conventions, was the consent of distinct sovereignties, and therefore the consent of nine states could not bind four dissenting states, or even one. A majority of a state legislature or convention dictates to a minority, because it exercises the sovereignty of an associated people over individuals. If state nations had not existed, they could not have exercised this authority over minorities, and therefore it is necessary to admit their existence in order to bestow validity upon the federal constitution.

The establishment of state governments, demonstrates the existence of state nations. No act can ascertain the existence of a sovereign and independent community more completely, than the creation of a government; nor any fact more completely prove that these communities were each constituted of a distinct people, than that of their having established different forms of government. If the art of construction shall acquire the power both of dispensing with the meaning of words, and also with the most conclusive current of facts by which these words have been interpreted, it will be able, like the dispensing power of kings, to subvert any principles, however necessary to secure human happiness, and to break every ligament for tying down power to its good behaviour.















Veto of federal public works bill
March 3, 1817

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

Having considered the bill this day presented to me entitled "An act to set apart and pledge certain funds for internal improvements," and which sets apart and pledges funds "for constructing roads and canals, and improving the navigation of water courses, in order to facilitate, promote, and give security to internal commerce among the several States, and to render more easy and less expensive the means and provisions for the common defense," I am constrained by the insuperable difficulty I feel in reconciling the bill with the Constitution of the United States to return it with that objection to the House of Representatives, in which it originated.

The legislative powers vested in Congress are specified and enumerated in the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution, and it does not appear that the power proposed to be exercised by the bill is among the enumerated powers, or that it falls by any just interpretation with the power to make laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution those or other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States.

"The power to regulate commerce among the several States" can not include a power to construct roads and canals, and to improve the navigation of water courses in order to facilitate, promote, and secure such commerce without a latitude of construction departing from the ordinary import of the terms strengthened by the known inconveniences which doubtless led to the grant of this remedial power to Congress.
To refer the power in question to the clause "to provide for common defense and general welfare" would be contrary to the established and consistent rules of interpretation, as rendering the special and careful enumeration of powers which follow the clause nugatory and improper. Such a view of the Constitution would have the effect of giving to Congress a general power of legislation instead of the defined and limited one hitherto understood to belong to them, the terms "common defense and general welfare" embracing every object and act within the purview of a legislative trust. It would have the effect of subjecting both the Constitution and laws of the several States in all cases not specifically exempted to be superseded by laws of Congress, it being expressly declared "that the Constitution of the United States and laws made in pursuance thereof shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges of every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." Such a view of the Constitution, finally, would have the effect of excluding the judicial authority of the United States from its participation in guarding the boundary between the legislative powers of the General and the State Governments, inasmuch as questions relating to the general welfare, being questions of policy and expediency, are unsusceptible of judicial cognizance and decision.

A restriction of the power "to provide for the common defense and general welfare" to cases which are to be provided for by the expenditure of money would still leave within the legislative power of Congress all the great and most important measures of Government, money being the ordinary and necessary means of carrying them into execution.

If a general power to construct roads and canals, and to improve the navigation of water courses, with the train of powers incident thereto, be not possessed by Congress, the assent of the States in the mode provided in the bill can not confer the power. The only cases in which the consent and cession of particular States can extend the power of Congress are those specified and provided for in the Constitution.

I am not unaware of the great importance of roads and canals and the improved navigation of water courses, and that a power in the National Legislature to provide for them might be exercised with signal advantage to the general prosperity. But seeing that such a power is not expressly given by the Constitution, and believing that it can not be deduced from any part of it without an inadmissible latitude of construction and reliance on insufficient precedents; believing also that the permanent success of the Constitution depends on a definite partition of powers between the General and the State Governments, and that no adequate landmarks would be left by the constructive extension of the powers of Congress as proposed in the bill, I have no option but to withhold my signature from it, and to cherishing the hope that its beneficial objects may be attained by a resort for the necessary powers to the same wisdom and virtue in the nation which established the Constitution in its actual form and providently marked out in the instrument itself a safe and practicable mode of improving it as experience might suggest.
James Madison,
President of the United States